Introduction: Encounters After the Soviet Collapse: The Contemporary Chinese Presence in the Former Soviet Union Border Zone by Hofman, I. (Irna) et al.
 
1 
Introduction: Encounters after the Soviet collapse: The contemporary Chinese presence in 
the former Soviet Union border zone  
Irna Hofman, Oane Visser, and Artemy Kalinovsky 
 
When citing this article please refer to the journal article version: 
Irna Hofman1, Oane Visser2, and Artemy Kalinovsky3 (2020) Introduction: Encounters after the 
Soviet collapse: The contemporary Chinese presence in the former Soviet Union border zone. 
Problems of Post-Communism, vol. 67, issue 3, pp. 193-203.  
 
Abstract: 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the opening up of the former Soviet Union’s borders, cross 
border interactions between the former Soviet Union states and China have augmented, and 
particularly the impetus given by the Chinese authorities to the Belt and Road Initiative has increased 
the presence of various Chinese actors in the countries along China’s western border. Notably, China’s 
‘going global’ has received increasingly scholarly attention in the past few years. Hitherto comparative 
analyses or in-depth case studies on Chinese presence in the states along China’s western border are 
yet sparse. By focusing on specific actors and on the ground interactions, this special issue, which 
includes case studies of the interactions between Chinese and Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik actors, aims 
to show a) the diversity in scope, actors and modalities of involvement, and b) the sometimes 
ambiguous goals and interests within China’s going out strategy in the region. At the same time, it aims 
to present a more close-up study of the responses of the population in the host states. Through a focus 
on encounters on the ground, imaginaries, and perceptions, we aim to get deeper insights in the 
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1. China’s Silk Road endeavours from below 
"To forge closer economic ties, deepen cooperation and expand development space in the Eurasian region, 
we should take an innovative approach and jointly build an 'economic belt along the Silk Road'" (Xi Jinping 
2013).4 
"Tajikistan will continue to push deep coordination between our national strategy and the BRI and actively 
strengthen our regional cooperation, thus reaching more projects" (Emomali Rahmon 2019).5 
On the 7th of September 2013 Xi Jinping announced China’s Belt and Road Initiative, also called 
the One Belt One Road (OBOR). Since that day, Chinese projects ranging from small to large, 
and from private commodity trade to state-sanctioned loans and investments, are presented 
as part of this gargantuan initiative. The overwhelming impetus given by the Chinese 
authorities to the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), such as provisions for Chinese companies and 
credit provided by Chinese banks (such as the Chinese Development Bank), highlights the 
increased importance of the initiative, in which China’s direct border zone appears important.  
While Central Asia is a destination for Chinese goods and investments in itself, beyond that it 
has become an important transit area for the new Silk Road between China and the large EU 
market, with a new, big railway and road transport hub like Khorgos in Kazakhstan, now 
constituting an important knot connecting Beijing all the way by rail with London, and the -
now Chinese owned- Greek port Piraeus. Such hubs with their new connections have been 
labelled “game changers” (Dave 2018, 99, see also Rolland 2017) as they potentially benefit 
recipient countries. These developments not only allow unprecedented large volumes of 
goods to travel over land, but simultaneously generate a rapid rise in manifold exchanges 
between Chinese investors, shuttle traders, overseas farmers and other Chinese citizens and 




(Accessed 5 February 2020).  
5 https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201904/26/WS5cc26932a3104842260b8863.html (Accessed 5 February 
2020).  
6 Turkmenistan remains much more isolated than the other Central Asian states, and insights on the Chinese 
presence in the Turkmen economy and society remain limited as a result of the difficulty to conduct research 
and journalism in the country.  
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In countries receiving increasing Chinese attention and investments, the developments, in 
forms of flows of money, people, and goods, have triggered and strengthened a lot of ideas 
and “imaginaries” of what “China” aims for, does, and wants. These on the ground exchanges, 
daily encounters and the expectations and imaginaries connected to them, constitute the 
main focus of this special issue. As such, this special issue addresses China’s going global in 
Central Asia and Russia’s Far East “from below”. It studies the incarnations of these global 
tendencies (and the local responses they generate) on the ground by zooming on the micro-
level with the help of ethnography and local surveys. Such an approach has been virtually 
absent so far in the surge of attention for China’s BRI. An exception is the special issue in the 
Central Asian Survey (see Alff 2016; Parham 2016; Steenberg 2016). However, that issue 
focused exclusively on border interactions along China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region 
(XUAR), whereas the special issue this article introduces, investigates encounters beyond the 
immediate border, treating Central Asia and the Southern areas of Russia’s Far East as one 
large region of intensifying cross-border exchanges. 
 
Analyses of China’s role in the former Soviet border region have remained largely macro, with 
a focus on state- or even Central Asia level politics and economics, and broad discourses (such 
as the work by Laruelle and Peyrouse 2012; Kerr 2010), perhaps due to the difficulties 
associated with conducting research in this geographic space largely ruled by authoritarian 
regimes.7 While macro-level analyses give us important insights in state-level interactions, 
including within multilateral organisations (such as the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, 
focused primarily on the aspect of security and the three “evils”: terrorism, separatism and 
extremism), at the same time, such a macro view has the danger of leading to a monolithic 
approach to “China” and actions undertaken by Chinese actors.  
 
The financing of the BRI has also gained increasing attention from policy-makers, media, and 
also from academia in the past few years (see for instance Lai et al. 2020, Bräutigam 2020). 
Yet already before the launch of the BRI foreign capital injections by the Chinese state and 
 
7 Further, the scant history of international studies on the region due to the isolation caused by the sharp 
borders between the Soviet Union on the one hand, and both China and the West on the other, also has not 
been conducive to fieldwork. 
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Chinese banks, in the form of aid and loans, triggered a lot of attention in which particularly 
“debt trap diplomacy” featured prominently (Bräutigam 2020, Lai et al. 2020). Debt owed by 
Central Asian states to China is also frequently discussed in international media and by local 
actors in the Central Asian region, yet a matter we do not engage with in this special issue.  
 
We instead focus on interactions “on the ground”. In doing so this special issue aims to show 
a) the diversity in scope, actors and modalities of involvement, and b) the sometimes 
ambiguous goals and interests within China’s going out strategy in the region. Our special issue 
particularly focuses on imaginaries and perceptions of China held by different strata in 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan and Russia. In doing so it aims to present a more close-up 
study of c) the responses of the rural population (or better, different actors within it) in the 
host states. Through a focus on encounters on the ground, applying amongst others 
“ethnographies of encounter” (Faier and Rofel 2014), this special issue aims to get deeper 
insights in the nature and consequences of China’s involvement in the post-Soviet border 
region (on frontier encounters see also Billé et al. 2012).  
 
As a result of the growing interactions in the border zone, there is a host of actors involved in 
the Central Asian/Russian border region. The contributing papers cover a variety of countries 
from the Post-Soviet/Central Asian borderlands (Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan), and 
a range of actors. The papers have an extensive empirical base with insights from recent field 
research. They provide insights from ethnography and surveys and analyses encounters, 
interactions and attitudes that take place on the ground, while also drawing out the wider 
importance of these case studies for understanding the Chinese presence in the region at 
large, and possibly beyond. 
 
Next to the bottom-up view, another feature of this special issue is that it does not only 
engage with the contemporary developments, but actively and critically engages with the role 
of imaginaries of the future, as well as legacies (and imaginaries) of the past in shaping current 
encounters. The importance of these temporalities in understanding the current encounters 
within China’s BRI, is aptly captured by Karrar (2016, 335), who noted that: “The Silk Road is a 
flexible trope, capturing everything from an imaginary of an idyllic past to a futuristic vision of 
hyper-connectivity between states.” Therefore, the next sections of this introductory article 
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will briefly discuss the envisaged future and the relevant histories that inform current 
encounters.  
 
The following, second, section will discuss the future orientation as expressed in official plans 
and projections regarding the BRI and China’s role in the region. The subsequent two sections 
will address the past. Beyond superficial references to the history of the old Silk Road, which 
are abundant in both policy, media and academic accounts of China’s rising role, nuanced 
attention to the continuities between China’s current role in Central Asia and more recent 
histories - such as Moscow’s role during the Soviet era, or China’s role in the Tsarist era - is 
scarce (see Lin 2018 for Chinese presence Tsarist Russia). Section three will discuss the Soviet 
past, focusing on continuities (and differences) between Moscow’s influence in the region 
during the Soviet era (and local responses to that influence), whereas section four will explore 
Beijing’s role in the pre-Soviet era, which was rather large, until it rapidly vanished after the 
distancing of communist China and the USSR during the 1960s, and the virtual closing of all 
the border crossings. Section five will introduce the individual papers of this special issue. 
 
2. Plans and Projections: The envisaged future of China in Central Asia and Russia’s Far East 
Since the 2000s, that is, before the official launch of the Belt and Road Initiative, China’s “going 
global” received growing media and scholarly attention. Particularly the growing Chinese 
presence on the African continent has been widely scrutinised, through cross-country studies 
and detailed case studies (Bräutigam and Zhang 2013, Driessen 2019, Lee 2016). However, 
comparative analyses or in-depth case studies on Chinese presence in the states along China’s 
North-Western border is yet sparse (Zhou 2017 and Hofman 2016 are some exceptions), while 
the characteristics and implications of China’s “going global” cannot be fathomed without a 
more comprehensive understanding of the way in which Chinese “going out” takes shape in 
China’s direct vicinity – an objective which also drives this special issue.  
 
Macro-level studies and reports of the BRI, in Central Asia and other regions, often focus on 
the future risks and threats coming along with China’s growing global influence (on the 
environmental impacts, see for instance Tracy et al. 2017). The country’s loans and 
investments are said to be particularly attractive for resource-scarce and cash-strapped states, 
such as Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and – outside Central Asia – countries such as Pakistan and Sri 
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Lanka. Indebtedness, in turn, can provide Chinese actors access to essential raw materials that 
are in high demand in China’s domestic economy, through a so-called debt/equity swap.  
 
Western analysts often draw attention to the fact that Chinese capital injections tend to come 
without strings attached, an approach with which the Chinese growing presence may 
challenge Western donors who tend to offer only conditional loans. In this way, Chinese 
capital injections may offer a welcome alternative to loans from the West, particularly for 
authoritarian regimes. One important exception to the non-conditionality of loans and 
investments however is that Chinese “soft loans” tend to include the requirement for host 
countries to employ Chinese contractors, and it is widely thought that Chinese contractors 
bring their own labourers along with their projects. The paper by Van der Kley in this special 
issue deals with labour in the context of Chinese projects in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. He 
nuances the above-mentioned assumption as he found that Chinese companies in Kyrgyzstan 
and Tajikistan do increasingly recruit a substantial part of employees locally.  
 
The Legacy of Soviet Development 
 
Contemporary issues related to Chinese involvement in Central Asia have to be understood 
against the background of Soviet development and the complicated legacies that the USSR 
left behind. Whereas the Chinese involvement is widely depicted as a break with the past, 
aside from its origin (China/Beijing versus USSR/Moscow), it actually represents a mix of 
remarkable continuities as well as – unsurprisingly – some dissimilarities.  Continuity between 
Soviet approaches and Chinese ones is most visible in three areas: infrastructure, extraction, 
and industrialization. In these areas Chinese companies, backed by Chinese capital, are either 
stepping in to directly revive Soviet-era projects, or to continue more generally what the USSR 
was doing by new means and with new technologies. By contrast, with regards to agriculture 
and education, Chinese involvement is both more varied and represents more of an explicit 
break with the Soviet legacy.  
During the first Soviet five year plan (1928-1932), Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and 
Turkmenistan were assigned the role of cotton producers for the socialist economy. As a 
result, most investment that came from Moscow was geared to irrigating lands to make that 
possible, with major projects such as the Great Ferghana Canal that runs through Tajikistan 
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and Uzbekistan and the Vakhshstroi waterworks in Tajikistan (a giant water work constructed 
by the Soviet leadership, located in southwest Tajikistan) (Teichmann 2007, Reid 2016, 
Obertreis 2017, Peterson 2019).  In the post-World War II era, cotton production continued 
to expand, but in line with Lenin’s slogan “Communism is Soviet power plus electrification” 
the Soviet Union also committed to electrification, and, next to that, to industrialization. These 
two aims spurred investment in hydropower plants, primarily in mountainous Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan as well as in the exploration of oil and gas fields in Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and 
Uzbekistan. Together the hydrocarbon republics and the hydropower republics formed a 
united energy system which was supposed to balance out the seasonal variations in 
hydropower production.  
Aside from bringing electricity to residential consumers, this energy system was 
supposed to support a range of factories that would draw on the workforce made available 
by the region’s booming population. However, while many factories were built, they generally 
failed to make much use of the Central Asian labour force, and instead ended up importing 
labour from outside the region. By the 1980s, concerns about pollution from giants like the 
aluminium plant in Tajikistan led to popular opposition to further industrial construction, as 
well as to large dams. The construction of the Roghun dam in Tajikistan, that began in the 
1970s, was frozen in 1990.   
The Roghun dam aptly illustrates the changing geopolitical landscape as well as the 
long-term continuities in large-scale infrastructural projects. Following the abandonment of 
the project at the time of the demise of the Soviet Union, Russia attempted to re-start the 
project in 1994. Yet an agreement between Tajikistan and Russia to this end never 
materialised. Subsequently, a Western consortium involving the World Bank and an Italian 
construction company renewed the project, which was stalled due to a complaint by 
neighbouring Uzbekistan filed by the World Bank, for fear of a drying up of the rivers and 
canals used for irrigating its downstream cotton fields. In 2017, a Chinese company resumed 
the building of the dam. The following year, Uzbekistan, also a recipient of Chinese loans and 
infrastructural projects, gave up its resistance against the dam project. These steps shed some 
light on the complicated steps taken by the Tajik government to finance the Roghun project. 
Notably already earlier on, the Tajik government forced the Tajik population, including 
households but also individuals, to buy shares of the project, only to gather capital to continue 
constructing the dam. People in rural Tajikistan, who were forced to spend part of their limited 
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household budget to buy shares, keep their paper shares filed with other personal documents, 
but seriously question the meaning of them (Hofman fieldwork, 2013). More recently, in 2017, 
the Tajik government placed 500 million US dollars “worth of international bonds with the 
express aim of funding project” (Eurasianet 2019). 
 The Soviet Union also vastly expanded imperial road and rail projects, connecting the 
region physically to the European core of the Soviet Union. By the end of the Soviet period, 
passengers and freight could travel by train between any of the Central Asian republics and 
Moscow although connections within the mountainous republic remained limited – the train 
from Tajikistan’s capital Dushanbe to Khujand in the north passed through neighbouring 
Uzbekistan to avoid the mountain ranges that lie between central and northern Tajikistan. 
Such arrangements meant little in the Soviet period, when republic borders did not impede 
movement, but they generated major complications after the USSR’s collapse.  
 Finally, the Soviet Union carried out exploration works throughout the region and 
developed mines for the extraction of precious metals. These included gold mined in 
Kyrgyzstan, silver in Tajikistan, and uranium for the nuclear industry in northern Tajikistan, 
Kazakhstan, and copper in Mongolia (which although not part of the Soviet Union, was one of 
its satellite states, and part of the Comecon). How much these sites benefited the local 
population depended on their function and the role they played in Soviet domestic politics 
and even foreign propaganda. Closed cities – such as nuclear sites in Kazakhstan or Chkalovsk 
outside Leninabad in Northern Tajikistan – offered a privileged life to those who lived within 
their confines (mostly outsiders, with some local political and technical elites). Few outsiders 
– let alone foreigners – were allowed to visit those cities, which received what was known as 
“Moscow provisioning;” food and other goods from around the USSR were sent to these cities 
to keep their residents happy. Even if they relied on the surrounding countryside for food, 
interaction was limited (Guth 2018, Florin and Zeller 2018, Wooden 2018). The contemporary 
complaints about Chinese companies bringing in their own workers, into compounds isolated 
from the surrounding local population (as critically discussed by van der Kley in this issue), 
with much of their food produced by local Chinese-owned farms (Hofman 2016b) suggest 
interesting parallels with the Soviet closed towns with their Russian specialists and the 
“Moscow provisioning”. 
 By the late 1980s, enabled by the space for debate by Gorbachev’s glasnost, and 
further reinforced by the Chernobyl disaster, Soviet development came under attack from 
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environmentalists as well as from nationalist activists and politicians from Central and Eastern 
Europe to Central Asia (Josephson et al. 2013, Weiner 1999). As already mentioned, the 
hydropower projects in Central Asia were recognized as being destructive locally and also 
blamed (correctly) for the infamous drying out of the Aral Sea (Spoor 1998, cf. Richardson 
2014 for a failed irrigation project elsewhere in the USSR). Industrial plants, once demanded 
by Central Asian politicians and planners, were now as polluting and of little benefit to the 
local population. Finally, the environmental impact of mining projects, especially the pollution 
of rivers and waterways, was an issue readily taken up by an emerging civil society (Wooden 
2018). But perhaps central to the disappointment of many Central Asians, including those who 
had once encouraged these projects, was that many seemed to benefit only European Soviet 
citizens, and did little for the local population (Kalinovsky 2018). 
 Although all of the Central Asian republics adopted market reforms in some form after 
independence, they retained many of the presumptions on which Soviet development policy 
was based. One was that a large population requires employment in the formal sector, and 
that state policy (often through parastatals) should be aimed at creating those jobs. Another 
is that cotton, despite all of the environmental consequences of its cultivation, continues to 
play an important role as an export commodity and thus a source of foreign currency (Hofman 
2018; Spoor 2007). If anything, in some of the Central Asian countries, cotton’s importance 
only increased after independence, because other sources of funding were so few (only 
showing some decline in recent years). A third was the continued focus on hydropower and 
hydrocarbons as sources of energy. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the new governments of the now independent Central Asian 
republics tried to preserve or revive the projects that had been condemned at the end of the 
previous decade. Tajikistan declared its intention to revive the Roghun Dam – discussed above 
– while still embroiled in Civil War; Kyrgyzstan sought foreign investors for its mines, and 
Kazakhstan invited foreign multinationals to develop its oil and gas fields. But with the USSR 
gone and Russia itself in dire economic straits, the republics lost their main source of 
investment and the customer base for its products, as well as the political unity that made 
cooperation on energy and infrastructure possible.      
 It is in these last two areas where China has stepped in most dramatically. The Belt and 
Road Initiative revives Soviet-era connectivity projects, but goes much further. Chinese mining 
firms can be found almost everywhere Soviet geologists once operated, and are even 
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exploiting some deposits that had been passed over in the Soviet period because of their 
technical difficulty. Further, Chinese firms are reviving older industrial sites or building new 
ones. Most recently, a Chinese company expressed interest in buying and modernizing 
Tajikistan’s massive aluminium plant. Of course, China’s involvement takes place in a very 
different political economy compared to that which existed until the late 1980s; the 
economies have been liberalised to varying degrees, and many of the enterprises and farms 
in which China is investing have been privatized, at least formally, and a wide variety of farms 
– in terms of size and legal-organisational status – has emerged across and within countries.8   
 One area where Chinese firms, until recently, seemed uninterested in taking over from 
the USSR was in the area of human capital. Although they were not always successful, Soviet 
industrial enterprises made a concerted effort to hire and educate locals, and to train them 
for senior technical and managerial jobs through a network of universities and institutes in 
the republics themselves. Even from Mongolia, which was “only” a Soviet satellite state, many 
local specialists were trained in Soviet institutes (Sneath 2015).9  China has only recently 
begun to take up such a role, providing scholarships to Central Asian students to study in 
China. At the same time, Chinese enterprises tend to hire Chinese labourers in particular for 
technical components of their projects, as well as for instance for catering food (Hofman, 
fieldwork Tajikistan 2020). The hiring of Chinese labour for these segments of the work remain 
despite the fact that millions of Central Asians are forced to travel to Russia and beyond to 
look for work on construction sites, in factories, and in the service sector.10  Nevertheless, the 
trend in recent years seems to be towards more use of local labour. As van der Kley argues in 
this volume, Chinese companies appear to become more receptive to demands from 
governments in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan to include more local labour in their projects, using 
citizens of these countries for up to 70 or 80 percent of their labour force on some projects. 
 
8 See for instance the growing divergence between farms in the highland and lowland Tajikistan (Hofman 2019) 
or the sharply grown divergences between herding farms in Mongolia and border regions in Russia following the 
Soviet collapse (Visser and Schoenmaker 2011). 
9 Mongolia’s national income grew with some 5-6% annually in the 1970s-1980s, with 37% of GDP coming from 
Soviet subsidies (Sneath 2015). 
10 The magnitude and importance of outmigration to Russia is illustrated most of all by Tajikistan which has 
become one of the most remittance dependent economies in the world.  
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Notably, there are no national laws that stipulate such percentages (Hofman, fieldwork 
Tajikistan 2020). What is more, China has begun to invest in education. Its investment in 
schools in Nurek, previously a Soviet showcase for including and training locals on an all-union 
project (in that case, the Nurek Dam), symbolizes China’s apparent willingness to fill the gaps 
left by the Soviet collapse more fully.   
 It seems clear, however, that the more Beijing and Chinese companies become 
involved in Central Asia, the less likely it is that they will be able to avoid the kind of criticism 
and protests faced by Soviet authorities by the late 1980s. In those years, protests mainly 
focused on the negative impact of industrial production, the cotton monoculture, and living 
standards that lagged behind the rest of the USSR. The (expected) negative (environmental) 
impact of Chinese investments in industrial production in Central Asia nowadays also plays a 
role in triggering anti-China sentiment in the region.  
In the late 1980s, critics argued that Moscow was earning much more from cotton than 
it was paying for it to producers or investing in the region, and that its industrial investments 
did not benefit the republics. Such criticism was not without merit, although in most cases it 
was overblown. In any case, Soviet economic policies were one part of a fairly intricate social 
contract which saw investments in health, schooling, shelter, and so on, at no direct, short-
term cost to the population but in exchange for its acquiescence and labour.11  
The aspect of “benefits” also features prominently in debates on Chinese investments, 
of which benefits (compared to Soviet leadership’s projects) are even less clear. Do they flow 
primarily to politically connected individuals and companies? Or does the broader population 
benefit in some ways as well? These are paramount questions that both Chinese companies 
and Central Asian governments will have to address, and future research needs to engage with 
them more in-depth.    
 In some areas, such as regarding questions of labour use and training, it is clear that 
China is prepared to listen to local concerns and take them into account. In others – such as 
the environment – it is much less clear how far Chinese firms are willing to listen to local 
concerns. One of the things that makes China an attractive development partner for many 
governments is that it does not practice conditionality the way that IFIs and donors from 
Europe and North America tend to do. Chinese investments and aid are not tied to questions 
 
11 The longer-term cost constituted the environmental effects. 
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of democracy, human rights, or environmental stewardship. The corollary, however, is that 
Chinese firms expect local governments to ward off any political challenges and popular 
mobilisation to their activities.   
Increasing anti-China sentiment is overtly expressed in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, 
where it has already created problems and will almost certainly create more. Those protests 
particularly relate to society’s concerns over sovereignty, exploitation of labour and the 
environment. In the last few years, the “Uyghur question” has also increasingly concerned 
Central Asian societies, and in Kazakhstan increasingly sparked debates (Putz 2018). Yet 
awareness of concerns such as the situation in Xinjiang is confined to localities; in isolated 
parts in the Central Asian region, where people can only access state-controlled media and 
are mainly concerned with daily survival, much less is known about these developments and 
debates. Remarkably, this seems different with the present spread of the Coronavirus 
(February 2020), which (worldwide, but certainly also in Central Asia), strengthens Sinophobia 
and the “othering” of Chinese people.  
 
China- former SU relations from a historical perspective 
 The current Chinese influence not only shows similarities with Moscow’s Soviet 
involvement in the region. In an even longer-term historical perspective it can be seen as a re-
emergence of China’s substantial pre-Soviet influence in the region (up till the late Tsarist 
period). 
 While the contributions in this special issue look at contemporary interactions, 
historical interactions and relationships are the backdrop of contemporary encounters 
between Chinese actors and host societies in the former Soviet Union border zone. What is 
more, historical ties are of importance particularly when it comes to expectations and 
perceptions, myths and imaginaries, as also described by Saxer in this special issue. As Garibov 
(2018) described, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, and – from our own observations – also in 
Tajikistan, there is widespread fear for the growing number of temporary and permanent 
Chinese migrants, in which people recall historical struggles between Chinese empires and 
groups living in the area of today’s Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan (Garibov 2018).  
 Interactions in China’s Northern/Western border zones took place long before the 
Soviet arrival. Importantly, as Lin (2018) noted, there were substantial numbers of migrants 
from Asia in the Russian Far East, and “the Chinese formed the majority of these migrants, 
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making up 10-12% of the population in the Russian Far East in 1910 and a third of the 
population of Vladivostok in 1916.  It stoked further fears of a ‘Yellow Peril’, in which the 
Chinese (and Japanese) seemed poised to out-compete the Russians demographically and 
economically.” 
 The far east of what is now Russia belonged to China before the 1860s (Lin 2018), and 
the border between Tsarist Russia and China was erected at this time (Parham 2016). The 
drawing of borders has had lasting effects on groups living on both sides. As Parham (2016, 
351) noted, “[t]he existence of this new line gradually brought borderlanders into the orbit of 
state affairs as well as confronting local Kyrgyz pastoralists and Tajik/Pamiri subsistence 
farmers with new notions of bounded territoriality and political belonging.” Until today the 
relationship between China and Central Asia can be characterised as “warm politics, cold 
public” (Kerr 2010). This is a corollary of past relationships. Under Soviet rule, borders were 
sealed, and little interaction took place between the populations living on each side of the 
border. Alff (2016a, 329) argues “that the hardening of the border during the Sino–Soviet 
confrontation between the 1960s and 1980s severely limits social interaction between 
immediate borderland communities to this day.”12 This isolation triggered “othering” and 
imaginaries because of spatial and social distinctions (on imaginaries and place see also 
Humphrey 2014).  
 After two decades of hostility between the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of 
China, in the early 1980s four border posts were opened and trade gradually resumed 
between China and its western neighbours (Karrar 2016). Over the course of the years, shuttle 
trade has become particularly important. Particularly in the early days of Soviet 
independence, with severe economic contraction in the Central Asia states, petty trade in the 
border zone rapidly rose to become a prolific livelihood strategy (Karrar 2016). To this day, 
goods flow primarily from China into Central Asia and Russia’s Far East, rather than the other 
way around (see also Parham 2016).  The China-Central Asia/Russia trade is really unbalanced. 
Chinese goods have flooded the Central Asian markets in the past decade, which reinforced 
the post-Soviet contraction of the light industries in Central Asia. While Russia probably will 
benefit from exporting gas to China through the “Power of Siberia” gas pipeline, at the same 
 
12 The long border between Russia and Mongolia remained more permeable, as the latter while not being part 
of the Soviet Union, was part of the Comecon, and strongly interlinked with the Soviet Union. 
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time the gas pipeline under construction at present (2020) through Central Asia to China is 
controlled by China, with, besides the creation of employment, little involvement and benefits 
for the Central Asian economies through which the pipeline passes, such as Tajikistan. While 
there is an influx of consumer products and brands, which features for instance in daily 
encounters between Chinese and Russian itinerant traders (see Humphrey 2018), the self-
employment of Central Asian and Russian cross-border traders insufficiently compensate for 
the economic decline in border areas caused by the overall retraction of the (socialist) welfare 
state following the demise of the Soviet Union. While the Soviet leadership significantly 
invested in border zone localities until the late 1980s, the independent Soviet states have 
rather divested, leading to state neglect and deteriorated living conditions in settlements in 
the China-Central Asia border zone (Alff 2016b).  
 
Contributions to this special issue 
 Globally, China’s rise has triggered significant attention. Yet, as mentioned earlier, 
there has been a fixation on large-scale acquisitions of harbours, infrastructure, and extractive 
industries. These dynamics have triggered particular assumptions, imaginaries and myths 
regarding China’s growing global presence. Chinese actors are always coming; they are not 
going. In this special issue, we aim to highlight the interactions that commonly remain under 
the radar. In this way, we (also) want to question and challenge specific discourses and the 
rhetoric regarding China’s “going global.”  
Kembayev’s paper starts with the macro-level of bilateral relations and large 
investment project in infrastructure. Based on the case of Kazakhstan it illustrates very well 
how the relationship between China and Central Asia has been forged and successively 
strengthened since the 1990s. He also attends to the role of Russia and the United States in 
the formation of Kazakhstan-China relations, and notes that much of the appeal of the BRI for 
Kazakhstan is not (just) the improved physical connections and political and economic ties 
with China it brings, but also the possibilities the new infrastructure generates to smoothen 
pre-existing trade with Europe and Russia.  As such, the paper illustrates how “old” and “new” 
external powers shape the position of Central Asia in global trade flows. While this paper focus 
on geopolitics and large-scale investments, it also briefly engages with societal aspects by 




Imaginaries is an overarching concept of our special issue. Whereas Chinese 
investments and loans in the former Soviet Union border zone have significantly increased in 
the past few years, the Central Asian (and Russian) population primarily experienced China’s 
rising presence through the flow of goods that flooded the Central Asian markets. There was 
a virtual absence of “China” in everyday life beyond exposure to those consumer goods. Until 
the late 2000s, the Chinese companies operating in the border zone brought in their own 
labour. Chinese workers were segregated, living in isolated enclaves, and interactions 
between Chinese individuals and the host societies were minimal.  
 Over the past few years, this seems to change (see van der Kley this issue), particularly 
now Chinese individual entrepreneurs also cross the border in search for income earning 
opportunities. What is more, a growing group of Chinese individuals, who have entered 
Central Asia as employees of a large Chinese enterprise, venture out into new businesses. 
These endeavours undertaken by Chinese individuals, although often small-scale, have 
important implications, as they entail – in general – more interactions with the population in 
the respective host country (be it Russia or one of the Central Asian republics); because these 
Chinese individuals leaving the confines of the compounds of their previous large-scale 
employers need local housing, access to markets and middlemen, and to consumers. The past 
few years have clearly seen a significant rise in the number of Chinese individuals wandering, 
working, and residing in the centres of the Central Asian capital cities (Hofman, observations 
2019 and 2020), resulting in more frequent interactions and encounters between people in 
daily life.  
Through these personal encounters, grand labels and discourses (the “yellow peril” 
and the “red dragon”) tend to be unpacked and may be challenged (on different perceptions 
see also Peyrouse 2016). While we do not ignore the anti-Chinese sentiment featured in social 
media, in particular instances the discourse is in transformation. For example, for some 
segments of the younger generation in Central Asia, for whom migration to Russia used to be 
a primary source of livelihood, “China” is gaining traction as a potential trading partner, and a 
source of employment (fieldwork by Hofman, spring 2019 and 2020). However, the United 
States and Europe remain to be parents’ and youngsters’ first desire, despite knowing the 
difficulties of obtaining scholarship and visa requirements.  
 At the same time, the Chinese government and private Chinese actors take an active 
role in an attempt to modify the “China as a threat” discourse. Several initiatives undertaken 
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by Chinese corporate actors demonstrate “soft power,” and “corporate social responsibility.” 
In Tajikistan, Chinese enterprises have started building schools (Hofman fieldwork Tajikistan 
2020, see also Van der Kley, this issue). Yet the Russian government also continues to strive 
for influence in Central Asia, seen for instance in the construction of around a dozen of Russian 
schools in Tajikistan in the past few years (see Najibullah 2020). With regard to China, “soft 
power” is also reflected by efforts of the Chinese government nowadays to provide a 
substantial number of scholarships to students form Central Asia, as noted before (see also 
Garibov 2018). Apparently, besides tangible infrastructure projects and loans and investments 
in Central Asia’s extractive industries, the Chinese government now also has (hesitantly) 
started to attend to human capital development.  
 Through personal encounters “China” has become more visible and present in the 
everyday life of the ordinary Central Asian and Russian citizen. Before entertaining movies 
featuring Bruce Li and Jackie Chan appeared in Tajik media in the 2000s, many people thought 
of the Chinese as “яҷуҷу маҷуҷ” (Yajuju majuj) – a kind of wild horde taking over – (Kholbek 
2012).13 Humphrey’s (2018) earlier work on interactions in the China-Russia border is also 
insightful in this regard. She described not only practices but also perceptions of people 
involved in trade across such a stark border. Mutual perceptions and attitudes are coloured 
by imaginaries. Imaginaries also continue to surface in Central Asia, as described by Saxer in 
this special issue. Saxer highlights the striking absence of Chinese actors in Tajikistan’s Gorno 
Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast (GBAO). While there is widespread talk of Chinese who are 
coming to invest in the extraction of natural resources, their presence is not tangible. The 
rumours of Chinese investments continue to circulate, and Chinese trucks cross the region, 
but there is little interaction between incoming Chinese actors, and the local population.14 Yet 
“China” is present in daily life in artefacts, such as goods at the bazaar. “China” features also 
regularly in discussions, triggered by the growing Chinese presence in mining in the 
 
13  This expression used to denote the growing Chinese presence is also used in Pakistan (personal 
communication with professor Matthew Erie, October 2019).  
14 Chinese investment in the Tajik mining industry have substantially increased in the past decades, including in 
the mountainous Pamir region. Very recently (October 2019) a Chinese company was given access to a silver 
mine in Tajik Badakhshan have been allocated to Chinese investors, which (again) stirred up debate (see 
Ibragimova 2019).  
 
17 
mountainous region, and the border shift of 2011-12 with which a part of Tajik territory 
located in the Pamir mountains was handed over to China (as described by Saxer). One other 
striking observation of Saxer (also) concerns the fact that local people never really benefited 
from trade in the China-Tajik border zone (across the Kulma pass). This contrasts, as Saxer 
notes, with trade relations in Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan or Siberia, and makes the paradox of the 
Chinese presence in the Pamir region even more striking. The paradox observed by Saxer was 
also noted by Dave (2018, 100), who wrote: “One well-known expert on China [in Kazakhstan] 
mentioned that so far, these [Chinese] investments and projects are like apparitions: everyone 
talks about them, but nobody has seen them.” This seems reminiscent of observations of 
Hofman (2016a), who observed that Tajik rural dwellers were puzzled with the arrival of 
Chinese agribusinesses in their locality.  
Yet very recently people in various (remote) villages in the Pamir mountains have been 
noting changes, as Chinese traders have started to approach village inhabitants to buy up wool 
products of local livestock (Hofman, interview with an international organization in Tajikistan, 
24 February 2020). At the same time, in the past couple of years relatively high educated 
young people from the mountainous region are increasingly recruited by Chinese universities 
to teach English. These developments call for growing attention on the economic implications 
of China’s growing presence in Central Asia, and the potential changes in discourses they may 
trigger.   
 Chen and Günther (also) attend to perceptions on China in their paper in this special 
issue, which they interrogate in their paper through survey data conducted among Kazakh, 
Kyrgyz, Uzbek as well as Afghan students. While not everyone in Central Asia (and in 
neighbouring Afghanistan) might be aware of differences, Chen and Günther describe that 
there are actually two conceptualisations of China in the region: Khitoj (or Khitoy), used in 
reference to the Chinese state, and Chin, which has a different connotation, being related to 
Chinese people, culture, traditions, and art. The survey results of Chen and Günther show that 
there are varying opinions and ideas regarding China’s influence in the Central Asian region; 
Kazakh respondents of their survey show a relatively positive stance towards China, while 
Kyrgyz adolescents are more sceptical. Chen and Günther explain differences by – amongst 
other factors – people’s perception of their own country, i.e. its strength and stability vis-à-vis 
China and other countries. Remarkably, given all the international media attention, Chen and 
Günther observe that only few students appear to know about the BRI (or the One Belt One 
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Road (OBOR)). Among the students in the different countries, Kazakh students appear to have 
the most positive stance towards China. Chen and Günther attribute this to the fact that 
Kazakhstan is a relatively strong actor in Central Asia, and “China as a business partner and 
investor stabilizes the Kazakhstani national narrative.” Of course it is a question to what extent 
students’ perceptions reflect the sentiment of the overall population in that country (and the 
Central Asian region at large). One can imagine huge divergences in sentiment regarding the 
Chinese presence between university students, who might envision a future studying in China, 
and say farmers who may fear a Chinese land acquisition in their vicinity (see also Peyrouse 
2016 on different perceptions).  
 Others have noted the mythification and imaginaries of China. Scarborough (2019) 
found that the Tajik state agency ‘Tadzhikvneshtorg,’ sent telegrams to a number of Chinese 
firms in 1990 to inquire the potential interest among Chinese investors to invest in turtle 
production in Tajikistan for sales in China. Apparently Tajik businessmen had particular 
“culinary assumptions” and thought to tap into the (assumed) demand for turtles in China. 
There was no response from the Chinese side. Whereas people tend to admire the Chinese 
work ethic – as Chinese individuals are thought to labour day and night – on the whole, 
derogatory ideas about China prevail. It is thought that Chinese people next to their (actual) 
preference for pork, also eat dogs and donkeys, and food imported from China is thought to 
make people ill, as chemical input use in Chinese agriculture would be enormous. The current 
Corona virus (January 2020). obviously strengthens those ideas. China’s mighty population 
numbers and outmigration are (also) issues triggering fear in Central Asia (see also Burkhanov 
2018).15 In 2013, a Tajik member of parliament raised concern over intercultural marriages, in 
particular regarding marriages between Chinese and Central Asian individuals (Umarzoda 
2013). In Kazakhstan, the media has (also) paid significant attention to the “possibility that 
masses of Chinese men would come to Kazakhstan to marry Kazakh women” (Burkhanov 
2018, 159). Hence there is a lot of fear mongering about China’s growing presence in Central 
Asia, even though the primary migration pattern of Chinese in Central Asia is of temporary, 
not permanent nature (which we argue based on fieldwork of Hofman in Tajikistan, 
2019/2020). 
 
15 It should be noted that the Chinese population will soon start to decline, reaching its peak of 1.44 billion 
already in 2029 according to predictions of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (Gonzalez 2019). 
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 The final paper in our special issue by Dirk Van der Kley. Van der Kley discusses Chinese 
companies’ hiring of local labour. His paper draws on a unique mix of data: fieldwork 
observations, and local as well as Chinese (media) sources. Van der Kley notes that there are 
misassumptions with regard to Chinese companies’ use of local and Chinese workers. 
Whereas nowadays there is more empirical work on Chinese firms operating overseas, which 
provides more nuanced pictures of Chinese firms’ labour regimes (see for instance Lee 2016, 
Oya and Schaefer 2019), Van der Kley notes that in Central Asia empirical studies are scarce 
in this regard, and the overall scholarly and popular literature still holds that Chinese firms 
predominantly import Chinese labour. Van der Kley’s paper therewith fills a void. He finds that 
Chinese companies active in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan employ local labour, to varying degrees. 
Reasons why Chinese companies active in Central Asia try to hire local labourers are 
governmental pressure as well as wages; local wages are lower than the rising Chinese wages. 
Barriers to recruit local labour are language barriers and the lack of professional skills. In order 
to overcome these obstacles Chinese companies train local Kyrgyz and Tajik workers in China. 
As a result, van der Kley argues, there is a trend towards more local labour recruitment.  
 Van der Kley’s findings thus point to the need for empirical work on the manifestation 
and materialisation of the Chinese presence in other countries. Particularly the current 
impetus given to BRI and the ideas, fears, and hopes that it may trigger, warrant scholarly 
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